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Recent Decisions
FEDERAL JURISDICTION OF ALLEGED TORTURER
UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
Filartiga V. Pena-Irala
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has found that
the Alien Tort Statute provides federal jurisdiction to sue for wrongful death
resulting from the use of torture conducted under color of official authority.'
Regardless of the nationality of the parties, whenever the alleged t6rturer
can be served with process by an alien plaintiff within the borders of the
United States, violation of the universally accepted norms of the internation-
al law of human rights demands this result.
Dr. Joel Filartiga and his daughter Dolly Filartiga, both citizens of the
Republic of Paraguary, appealed from a dismissal of their suit against
Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, also a Paraguayan citizen, for the wrongful
death of Dr. Filartiga's son, Joelito Filartiga.2 The appellants' complaint
alleged that on March 29, 1976, Joelito Filartiga was kidnapped and tortured
to death by Pena, who was then Inspector General of Police in Asuncion,
Paraguay.' The Filartigas maintain that this torture-murder was in retalia-
tion for the political activities of Dr. Filartiga, an opponent of President
Alfredo Stroessner's government.'
When the Filartigas began a criminal action in Paraguay against Pena
and the police, they were met with further retaliation and frustration. Their
attorney was arrested, brought to police headquarters, shackled to a wall and
threatened with death.' Later, during the criminal proceeding, a member of
1. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2nd Cir. 1980)
2. Id.
3. Id. That night the police brought the victim's sister, Dolly Filartiga, to Pena's
home where she was shown the body of her brother which evidenced marks of severe
torture. As she ran from the house, Pena followed, shouting, "Here you have what you
have been looking for for so long and what you deserve. Now shut up."ld.
The allegatibrs of the appellants' complaint were necessarily accepted as true on
appeal because the district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.
4. Id.
5. Id. The Filartigas allege their attorney has since been disbarred without
cause.
(289)
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Pena's household confessed to the slaying of Filartiga's son. The man claimed
that he found his wife and Joelito in the act of love and killed Joelito in a fit
of passion.' Dolly Filartiga, however, offered evidence of three autopsies
showing that her brother's death "was the result of professional methods of
torture."7
In July 1978, Pena entered the United States under a visitor's visa and
remained beyond the term of that visa. Dolly Filartiga, who also entered the
United States that year under a similar visa,' learned of his presence and
informed the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Pena was arrested
and ordered deported on April 5, 1979. Miss Filartiga then served a summons
and civil complaint on Pena for the wrongful torture-death of her brother,
seeking compensatory and punitive damages of ten million dollars.' The
appellants also sought to enjoin several officials of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service from deporting Pena to ensure his availability at
trial.'"
Federal jurisdiction was asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1331" and 28 U.S. C.
§ 1350, 12 the Alien Tort Statute, which states, "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
Originally, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York, Eugene H. Nickerson, J., dismissed the complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.'" While recognizing the strength of the argument
that official torture is a violation of international law, the court employed
dicta from two recent opinions'4 of the Second Circuit which interpreted "the
law of nations" as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1350 as excluding that law which
governs a state's treatment of its own citizens.'"
6. Id. The criminal proceeding was still pending at the time of this action more
than four years after its initiation.
7. Id.
8. Id. Miss Filartiga has applied for political asylum in the United States.
9. Id. at 879.
10. Id. n. 2. These defendants are no longer parties to this action because Pena
was deported after the district court's stay of deportation expired and both the Second
Circuit and the Supreme Court denied further stays.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States, ... "
12. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
13. 630 F.2d at 880.
14. Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976);
ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
15. 630 F.2d at 880.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the
judgment of the district court, holding that the Alien Tort Statute provides
federal jurisdiction whenever the alleged torturer can be served the process
within the United States."6 Since this civil action was clearly brought "by an
alien for a tort only," 7 the main question before the court was whether
torture under color of official authority is a violation of international law.
The court considered various methods of ascertaining the applicable
international law, including those articulated by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Smith:"6 "consulting the work of jurists, writing professedly
on public law, or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial
decisions recognizing and enforcing that law."' 9 The Filartigas submitted the
affidavits of several international legal scholars who unanimously concluded
that international law prohibits absolutely the use of torture as alleged in
the complaint. 0 Further, the court's opinion made use of the United Nations
Charter and several of the United Nations Declarations as foundations for its
conclusion. The United Nations Charter pledges all members to take joint
and separate action for the achievement of" " . . . universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all . . . "22
Freedom from torture is clearly a fundamental human right. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights states that "no one shall be subjected to
torture. ' A later General Assembly Resolution declared that the concepts of
16. Id. at 878.
17. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
18. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (Piracy).
19. Id. at 160-161.
20. Judge Kaufman's distillation of these affidavits was as follows: Richard Falk,
the Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice at Princeton Uni-
versity, and a former Vice President of the American Society of International Law,
avers that, in his judgment, "it is beyond reasonable doubt that torture of a person held
in detention that results in severe harm or death is a violation of the law of nations."
Thomas Franck, professor of international law at New York University and Director of
the New York University Center for International Studies offers his opinion that tor-
ture has now been rejected by virtually all nations, although it was once commonly
used to extract confessions. Richard Lillich, the Howard W. Smith Professor of Law at
the University of Virginia School of Law, concludes, after a lengthy review of the au-
thorities, that officially perpetrated torture is "a violation of international law (former-
ly called the law of nations)." Finally, Myres MacDougal, a former Sterling Professor of
Law at the Yale Law School, and a past President of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law, states that torture is an offense against the law of nations, and that "it has
long been recognized that such offenses vitally affect relations between states." 630
F.2d at 879 n. 4.
21. U.N. CHARTER, 59 Stat. 1033 (1945), Art. 56.
22. Id. at Art. 55.
23. G. A. Res. 217 (III)(A), 3 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 13) 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec.
10, 1948).
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the Universal Declaration constitute basic principles of international
cooperation." Finally, in 1975, the United Nations addressed the topic of
torture in the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture, 5 which absolutely prohibits any state from permitting
torture. Judge Kaufman concluded that "there are few, if any, issues in
international law today on which opinion seems to be so united as the
limitations on a state's power to torture persons held in its custody."26
The Court then analyzed the prohibition of torture under the "general
usage and practice of nations" test" noting numerous international treaties
prohibiting this practice 8 : the American Convention on Human Rights,
24. G. A. Res. (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 3, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(Oct. 24, 1970).
25. G. A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (Dec. 9,
1975). It states in part:
Article 1
1. For the purpose of this Declaration, torture means any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at
the instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes as obtaining from
him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or other per-
sons. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent or incidental
to lawful sanctions to the extent consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners.
2. Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.
Article 2
Any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment is an offense to human dignity and shall be condemned as a denial of the
purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as a violation of human rights
and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
Article 3
No state may permit or tolerate torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. Exceptional circumstances such as a state of war or a
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency may not
be invoked as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment.
26. 630 F.2d at 881.
27. See supra, note 18.
28. 630 F.2d at 883.
29. OAS T. S. No. 36 at 1, OAS Off. Rec. OEA /Ser 4 v/11 23, doc. 21, rev. 2
(English ed., 1975).
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Article 5,1 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights"; and the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Article 3.3' The Court also observed that, according to one survey,
torture is prohibited by the constitution of over fifty-five nations, 2 including
the United States33 and Paraguay.' Judge Kaufman's analysis also incorpo-
rated the experience of the United States diplomatic contacts, which he
viewed as further confirming the universal abhorrence of torture." In its
Memorandum to this action as Amicus Curiae, the United States stated that
in regard to nations with which it maintains diplomatic relations, "no
government has asserted a right to torture its own nationals."36 On the basis
of these sources, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded "that official
torture is now prohibited by the law of nations. The prohibition is clear and
unambiguous, and admits of no distinction between treatment of aliens and
citizens."3 Accordingly, the court refuted the Dreyfus dictum" upon which
the district court had partially relied in dismissing this action.
With the prima facie case for federal jurisdiction established, the court
then disposed of the appellee's arguments that jurisdiction cannot exist
consistent with Article III of the Constitution, notwithstanding a violation of
international law. The Second Circuit found, after a comprehensive historical
analysis,39 that, "The constitutional basis for the Alien Tort Statute is the law
of nations, which has always been part of the federal common law."4 A case
"aris[es] under the . . . laws of the United States"'" if grounded upon statutes
enacted by Congress or upon the common law of the United States.2
30. U.N. General Assembly Res. 2200 (XXI))A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49,
U.N.Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
31. Europ. T. S. No. 5 (1968), 213 U.N.T.S. 211 (semble).
32. 48 Revue Internationale de Droit Penal Nos. 3 and 4, at 208 (1977).
33. U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV.
34. PARAGUAY CONSTITUTION, Art. 45.
35. 630 F.2d at 884.
36. Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 16 n. 34.
37. 630 F.2d at 884.
38. Id. See also supra note 14.
39. The court reasoned that international law formed an integral part of the com-
mon law which became part of United States law upon the adoption of the Constitu-
tion. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 263-264 (1st ed. 1765-69). The court also
noted that under the Articles of Confederation, the Pennsylvania Court of Oyer and
Terminer at Philadelphia applied international law to the prosecution of assault upon
the French Consul-General, stating "[tihis law, in its full extent, is part of the law of
this state. Republica v. Delongchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 113, 119 (1784). 630 F.2d
at 886.
40. 630 F.2d at 885.
41. U.S. CONST. art. III, sec. 2, cl. 1.
42. 630 F.2d at 886.
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Pena's contention that the district court did not have jurisdiction because
the alleged tort occured in Paraguay was held to be without merit. The court
observed that common law courts regularly adjudicate tort claims that arise
in other geographical jurisdictions.43 The appellees basically conceded the
court's position; a state court would have jurisdiction where "the acts alleged
would violate Paraguayan law and the policies of the forum are consistent
with the foreign law,"" as long as that court had personal jurisdiction over
the parties.
Alternatively, the appellees argued that Article III does not specifically
refer to cases arising under international law and that the only reference to
the law of nations in the Constitution is contained in Article 1,11 giving
Congress the power to "define and punish .. .offenses against the law of
nations."" Thus, only those international laws which Congress has defined as
such are incorporated into the laws of this country.47 The court easily
rebutted this argument by citing numerous decisions applying international
law." The appellant's theory that the Alien Tort Statute was, in itself, an act
which sought to define a law of nations was also refused.49 Rather, the
statute's interpretation was limited to granting federal jurisdiction for
actions already recognized as violations of international law. 0
While this opinion is important because of its recognition of torture as a
gross violation of international law, the Pena decision will have little, if any,,
impact on the reduction of the kind of inhuman practices suffered by Joelito
Filartiga. That an alleged torturer can be found by the family of a victim in a
foreign country is an unusual occurrence. Rarer still is that the torturer is
found in the United States by the victim's family. Further, the most difficult
43. Id. at 885. After noting that a nation has a legitimate interest in the resolu-
tion of disputes among those within its borders, the court traced a line of cases stem-
ming from Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161 (1774) (the basis for state court jurisdiction
of torts arising outside its territorial jurisdiction) holding that personal injury suits,
wrongful death suits and wrongful death actions occuring outside the United States
(where unlawful where performed) are transitory. McKenna v. Fish, 42 U.S. (1 How.)
241 (1843); Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11 (1880); Slater v. Mexican National
Railroad Co., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
44. 630 F.2d at 885.
45. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8. "[1] The Congress shall have Power... 1101 To define
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the
Law of Nations."
46. Id., cl. 10.
47. 630 F.2d at 886.
48. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 198 (1796); The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677 (1900); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
49. 630 F.2d at 887.
50. Id.
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barriers to successful conclusion of such a trial in the United States were not
before the court on appeal. While torture is specifically banned in the
Paraguayan constitution, there are many nations which have no such formal
declaration of prohibition. If this case had been brought against a citizen of a
country which did not formally decry torture, the Act of State doctrine,
51
which precludes our courts from questioning the legality of governmental
acts of another nation within its own borders, might prevent our courts'
consideration of this action.
Finally, the most crucial obstacle might well be the question of forum
non conveniens52 The appellee submitted an affidavit of his Paraguayan
counsel stating that Paraguay has a full civil remedy for the act of torture
and wrongful death of a citizen.53 Clearly most of the witnesses are located in
Asuncion, Paraguay. The possibility of thoroughly investigating the claim
and assembling all the witnesses and evidence in the United States is
extremely remote. Hence, the defendant could forcefully and perhaps
successfully argue that he is being unjustly forced to litigate in a forum far
from the location where the alleged tort arose. In light of these problems, the
Alien Torts Act will likely remain a rarely used basis of federal jurisdiction. '
Nonetheless, the decision should be heralded because of its reaffirmation of
the basic rights which should be shared by all of mankind.
51. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
52. The considerations for the application of this doctrine include the case and cost
of securing witnesses and proof and all other barriers which promote an expeditious
and inexpensive trial. Dilella v. Lehigh Val. R. Co., D.C. N.Y., 7 F.R.D. 192, 193
(1947).
53. 630 F.2d at 879 n. 5.
54. 28 U.S.C. 1350 has previously been used as a basis for federal jurisdiction
where the violation of international law was a falsified passport, Adra v. Clift, 195 F.
Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961), and as an alternative basis in an action to determine own-
ership of slaves on enemy vessels seized in international waters.
